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Approximately two billion people around the world use the Internet today. In the developed world, 
most commercial and public services are now available online, and most of us wouldn’t want to go 
back to the pre-Internet age. But as the value of transactions we can do online has increased and the 
amount of data we generate has grown, so has the number of those looking to redirect these 
transactions for their own benefit. Some criminals want access to our computers to make them part of 
their botnets; some want our authentication credentials and financial information so they can steal our 
money or sell us fake or nonexistent goods. Commercial organizations collect our personal data, 
including potentially sensitive data, from our online behavior, preferences, locations, and contacts. And 
if we suffer a security breach, it can affect others: our family, friends and neighbors, and even service 
providers. As users learn about these risks, they’re coming to the realization that controlling what 
personal data is online and who can access it can mitigate those risks.  
This special issue of IEEE Security & Privacy focuses on what we—as individuals and 
collectively—can do to protect ourselves and our information as it’s gathered, shared, used, and 
managed. What do we have to know, and be able to do, to protect ourselves? Do computer security and 
privacy experts currently provide us with realistic, actionable advice? Do companies and governments 
who encourage us to use online communications and transactions do what’s necessary to protect us?  
Today’s computer security professionals can draw from a set of well-established concepts and 
mechanisms, such as authentication and access control, to keep attackers out of systems. But as 
Cormac Herley argues in his article, “More Is Not the Answer,” many of these measures are ineffective 
because they require too much attention and effort from inexperienced users. Even experienced users 
often ignore security advice because the workload and complexity required to follow that advice 
exceeds the risks those individuals expect to face.  
Traditionally, security researchers and practitioners didn’t consider user effort a limited resource—
and this has to change. Security mechanisms that might have required reasonable effort when first 
deployed in the pre-Internet age aren’t fit for protecting today’s much larger and more diverse user 
community; people juggle many devices with different interaction modes and use dozens of online 
services in a variety of environments. Herley demonstrates that, in the Internet age, security designers 
and practitioners should consider user attention and effort first and foremost when putting protection 
mechanisms in place.  
This echoes “Shouldn’t All Security Be Usable?” Mary Theofanos and Shari Lawrence Pfleeger’s 
Guest Editors’ Introduction to S&P’s special issue on usable security in March/April 2011: to be 
effective, security must be usable—it is not a luxury or optional extra.  
Usability and security complement one another. We need to make it easy for the user to do the right 
thing, hard to do the wrong thing, and easy to recover when the wrong thing happens anyway. 
But despite a flurry of activity in research on usable security over the past 10 years, we have seen 
little change in practice. Whilst practitioners accept that security ought to be usable, they cannot deliver 
it Captain Jean-Luc Picard-style – with a nod of the head and saying “Make it so”.  As Theofanos and 
Pfleeger pointed out, it requires a changing the thinking and processes of everyone involved in system 
and service design and delivery: 
[B]oth usability and security have been poor step-children during system development, often added to an 
application only at the end of the development process. Understanding that these attributes must be built as 
an integral part of a system’s design, experts in both security and usability have developed methodologies 
to do just that. 
Unfortunately, many software applications weren’t delivered in this way. As Simson Garfinkel 
shows in his contribution in this issue, “Leaking Sensitive Information in Complex Document Files—
and How to Prevent It,” the software tools we use every day can trip up even security-aware and highly 
motivated users who are trying to redact sensitive information from documents. His analysis reveals 
that this happens largely because one of the oldest usability principles—what you see is what you get—
isn’t supported. Existing software gives users the impression that information they have tried to redact 
is no longer accessible to a reader when in fact it’s only superficially obscured. Garfinkel’s conclusion 
confirms Theofanos and Pfleeger’s point: the features that support redaction seem to have been “tacked 
on,” requiring a rare in-depth understanding of the way the software renders documents to get it right. 
To ensure their redaction is working, users must carry out tests that take more time and effort than most 
users are willing to spare (see Herley’s article). 
Herley’s insight that “more is not the answer” conflicts with the traditional security view that users 
should be prepared to make more effort because security is important. Many advocate security 
awareness and education to increase users’ ability to recognize threats and change their behavior to 
minimize risk. In “Going Spear Phishing: Exploring Embedded Training and Awareness,” Deanna D. 
Caputo and her colleagues studied the effects of training against spear phishing attacks under realistic 
conditions in the workplace. They found that the embedded training they tried to provide—using an 
approach that previous usable security research reported to be effective—did not lead to fewer 
employees clicking a link in a spear phishing message. When none of the four training variants they 
created—based on state-of-the-art psychology research—made a difference, they concluded that 
effective embedded training must take into account not only framing and security experience but also 
perceived security support, information load, preferred notification method, and more.  
This again confirms Herley’s assertion that security measures that require more user attention and 
effort are likely to fail. It also indicates that we must be extremely careful not to adopt new usable 
security solutions based on results from one-off laboratory or short-term crowdsourcing studies. The 
competing demands for user attention and effort are rarely adequately replicated in these studies, and 
short-term changes in behavior in response to interventions can fade over time. 
“Helping You Protect You,” our roundtable discussion with two experts representing major online 
service providers (Markus Jakobsson from PayPal and Sunny Consolvo from Google) and two leading 
academic researchers (Rick Wash from Minnesota State University and L. Jean Camp from the 
University of Indiana), shows that service providers understand that effective security can’t require too 
much knowledge and effort. Authentication is a key example; we learn that many service providers are 
now moving to two-factor authentication (2FA) solutions, which can deliver improved security at 
lower user effort. But we must be mindful that those solutions must be accessible to all online users not 
just in terms of knowledge and effort but also in terms of cost.  
Camp, who has carried out many studies with older users, points out that these are keen users who 
have much to gain from online participation, but they are risk averse. Warnings saying “you are at risk” 
are off-putting and unhelpful here. Furthermore, older users might be unable or unwilling to own a 
smartphone, which is the second factor of choice in many 2FA solutions currently deployed or planned. 
Our experts agree that we need a fair division of responsibility between users and service providers. 
Many commercial service providers understand that it makes sense for them to take care of those 
aspects of security requiring expert knowledge and resources. They also understand that it doesn’t 
make sense for them to scare their customers. As Jakobsson says: 
It creates a sense of paranoia and fear, which makes some people throw up their hands and say, 
“there’s nothing to be done about security,” and then totally ignore it. 
That is not what we want; individuals have to take some responsibility to get effective and 
affordable protection online. But these responsibilities must be stated clearly and be understandable 
and manageable. As Camp points out, we can’t protect online users from all risks all the time: 
[I]f people are aware they’re taking a risk, I don’t think that you should stop them. People have the right 
to be wrong and silly and everything else we are, but they should only take these risks knowingly. 
Currently, most users are given no choice, because what they would need to do to protect 
themselves requires more experience than they have and more attention and effort than they can spare. 
Usable security is often seen as simply an enabler of good security behavior: if the actions required 
are not too difficult or effortful, users will do so. But human-centred design of security means enabling 
users to make informed security choices. Firstly, their preferred choice needs to be available. Authors 
of privacy policies should take note here, and service providers need to manage their security issues 
without burdening legitimate customers (solving CAPTCHAs to prove you are human is not something 
a customer would chose to do, ever).  Second, we need to accept that users sometimes chose to take 
risks.  Protecting users means giving them an accurate understanding of possible consequences, and the 
likelihood of them occuring. " 
